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1. Introduction 
Deterministic fire hazard analyses, investigations of the operating experience at nuclear 
installations and fire probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) (OECD 2015) have demonstrated that 
knowledge of the frequency of the occurrence of fires is an important contributor to nuclear 
power plant (NPP) fire risk assessment. However, fires and associated plant responses are 
complex phenomena, and therefore the estimates of fire risk are subject to considerable 
uncertainty. Fire PRA has often been characterized as being less mature and less realistic 
than other internal events PRA. Perceptions of immaturity can affect stakeholders’ use of fire 
PRA information. Unrealistic fire PRA results could affect fire-safety related decisions and 
improperly skew comparisons of risk contributions from different hazards (Siu & Sancaktar 
2015). Modelling the firefighting defence-in-depth including human actions can be used to 
reduce conservatism by taking into account the possibility of preventing the damages of critical 
components and failures of safety functions in a fire situation. Attempts of this kind of approach 
have earlier been made by e.g. (Hostikka et al. 2012) and (Kloos et al. 2014), but practicality 
of the method still needs further development. 
One of the main limitations of the current fire PRA methodology is that it is not capable of 
adequately accounting for the dynamic behaviour and effects of fire due to its reliance on the 
classical PRA methodology i.e. event trees and fault trees (Sakurahara et al. 2014). In this 
study, simulation-based event trees of FinPSA software (Tyrväinen et al. 2016; VTT, 2019) are 
used to model a cable room fire scenario. The aim is to develop an approach for more realistic 
fire PRA. Simulation-based event trees are particularly useful to model impacts of time delays 
and dynamic dependencies, such as how the time available for fire brigade to arrive depends 
on the progression of the fire itself, which contains significant uncertainties. The analysis is 
based on deterministic fire simulations performed using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
(McGrattan et al. 2013). One of the goals of the study is to find the best way to utilise the 
results of deterministic analyses in the event tree analysis. Combination of deterministic and 
probabilistic analyses is a general problem common to several areas of nuclear safety, such 
as the analysis of severe accidents, which has been the main application area of the 
simulation-based event trees of FinPSA software (Tyrväinen & Karanta 2019) and its 
predecessor SPSA (Silvonen 2013). Further objectives are also to study the applicability of the 
FinPSA tool to fire modelling, and identify software development needs. 
2. Cable fire case study 
This report continues the case study of a NPP cable room fire, which was originally presented 
in (Hostikka et al. 2012). The analysed cable room contains both power and I&C cables of two 
redundant subsystems. The cables of the subsystems are physically separated in a multi-level 
metallic cable tray system. In the places where the cables of different subsystems are close to 
each other, mechanical shield plates have been installed between the cable trays. The cables 
are the primary fire load in the room, and the power cables are the most probable source of 
ignition. In this study, the ignition was assumed to occur in the power cables of subsystem B, 
and the analysis aimed to estimate the probability of cable failure in subsystem D. 
The analysis was divided into two cases: the sprinkler system in operation and the sprinkler 
system failed. For each of the cases 100 fire simulations were stochastically generated and 
performed using PFS, i.e. Probabilistic Fire Simulator (Hostikka & Keski-Rahkonen 2003; 
Hostikka 2008), and FDS, i.e. Fire Dynamics Simulator (McGrattan et al. 2013). For each 
individual fire simulation, 1000 realizations of stochastic operation time simulations of 
firefighting operations were created. For each simulation point, it was checked whether the fire 
brigade was able to suppress the fire before the cable damage. In addition, it was checked 
whether the firefighting conditions were tolerable when the fire brigade arrived at the room. 
The model was implemented in PFS, which is an Excel tool, and the stochastic operation time 
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simulations were performed using random number sampling functions of Excel. The model can 
be interpreted as an event tree as presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: An event tree model for a cable fire (Hostikka et al. 2012). 
2.1 Operation time model 
The time delays of the operation time model were related to fire detection, control room 
operations and fire brigade operations. The simulation model includes eight phases: 
1. Detection 
There is a delay between the ignition and the detection. Detection can take place 
through smoke detectors and an automatic alarm system, sprinklers, or through the 
senses. 
2. Alarm 
The information about the detection is transmitted to the security centre and the 
control room of the NPP as well as to the Emergency Response Centre. The fire 
brigade receives the information via an alarm system and by phone. 
3. Fire brigade response 
After the alarm the fire brigade leaves the fire station and moves to the destination.  
4. Fire brigade clearance to the building entrance 
The first assessment of the situation, the unit manager's instructions, and the 
transition to the front door. 
  
RESEARCH REPORT VTT-R-01302-19 
5 (22) 
 
 
 
5. Fire brigade arrival at the room of origin 
Finding the destination, moving there and pressurizing the hoses. 
6. Co-operation with the plant personnel 
Collaboration is needed between the fire department and the control room. Fire 
brigade will check the situation and possibly ask for voltage cut-off in the room of 
origin. 
7. (Possibly) Voltage cut-off for the safety of the fire brigade using water-based 
suppression 
The operator performs the necessary actions from the control room. 
8. Systematic search 
Systematic search with thermal imaging. Extinguish the fire when it is found. 
Most of the phases consist of multiple actions, and the model includes possible additional time 
delays caused by human errors and equipment failures. The operational actions are illustrated 
in Figure 2. After the fire is detected, the control room calls the guard centre, which alarms the 
fire brigade. There are parallel actions related to control room personnel and arrival of the fire 
brigade. The control room sends a person to confirm that there is a fire. When the fire brigade 
arrives, the control room and the fire brigade need to co-operate, and the control room 
personnel may need to cut-off the voltage before the fire brigade can enter the room and 
suppress the fire. 
 
Figure 2: The operational actions related to firefighting (Hostikka et al. 2012). 
The total operation time delay from the ignition to the suppression is calculated as 
∆𝑡𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅 = ∆𝑡𝐷𝐸𝑇 +max[∆𝑡𝐶𝑅, (∆𝑡𝐺𝐶 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,1 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,2 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,3)] + ∆𝑡𝐶𝑂 + ∆𝑡𝑉 + ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,4, 
where ∆𝑡𝐷𝐸𝑇 is the delay from the ignition to the detection, ∆𝑡𝐶𝑅 is the time it takes for the 
control room to confirm the fire and perform other preparations before co-operating with the 
fire brigade, ∆𝑡𝐺𝐶 is the time it takes for the guard centre to alarm the fire brigade, ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,1 is the 
fire brigade response time, ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,2 is the fire brigade clearing time to the building entrance, 
∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,3 is the travel time from the building entrance to the room where the fire is located, ∆𝑡𝐶𝑂 
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is the delay related to the co-operation between the fire brigade and the control room, ∆𝑡𝑉 is 
the time it takes to cut-off the voltage, and ∆𝑡𝐹𝐵,4 is the time it takes to find and extinguish the 
fire. 
The details of the stochastic operation time model are presented in (Hostikka et al. 2012), 
(Kling 2010) and in Section 4, where the implementation of the model in FinPSA is presented. 
2.2 Fire simulations 
The Monte Carlo fire simulations were managed by Probabilistic Fire Simulator (PFS) 
(Hostikka & Keski-Rahkonen 2003; Hostikka 2008). PFS generated the simulation cases using 
Latin hypercube sampling based on given random variables, created the input files for FDS, 
managed the simulation runs and performed the post-processing of simulation results 
automatically. The random variables included the location of the initial fire, the size of the initial 
fire, properties of power cables and concrete, and the response of the sprinkler system (if 
working). 
For each simulation, it was studied when the temperature of the insulating material around the 
metal wires reaches the critical temperature. Since there is some uncertainty on what is the 
critical temperature for a cable to fail, two alternative critical temperatures, 180 °C and 215 °C, 
were used in the analysis. However, with the sprinkler system working, no cable failures 
occurred in the simulations. Without the sprinkler system, temperature 180 °C was exceeded 
in 66 simulations, and temperature 215 °C was exceeded in 64 simulations. The results 
included also smoke detector alarm time for each simulation. The resulting cable failure time 
distributions are presented in Figure 3 for the case without the sprinkler system. 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative probability distribution of cable failure time. The solid lines (a) represent 
time from the ignition, and the dash lines (b) represent time from the detection (Hostikka et al. 
2012). 
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Firefighting conditions were also evaluated in the simulations. The variables of interest were 
visibility, temperature and radiation at the doors of the room. For each variable and door, it 
was determined when the conditions became intolerable for firefighters. Smoke is a barrier to 
vision, and firefighters are also exposed to heat, which can prevent them from entering the 
room or at least limit the amount of time firefighters can stay in the room. However, only the 
information about visibility at door 1 at the altitude of 1.5 meters was utilised in the probabilistic 
analysis, because it was assumed that the fire extinguishing would primarily be done using this 
door and the visibility was the most critical variable. Figure 4 shows how the time of intolerable 
firefighting conditions (visibility at door 1) correlates with the cable failure time (based on the 
temperature limit 180 °C). In most cases, the visibility was lost around the same time with the 
cable failure, but there were also cases where the visibility was lost much earlier. 
 
Figure 4: Scatter plot between cable failure time and the time of intolerable firefighting 
conditions. 
Some new analyses were performed for the simulated 100 fires in this study. Figure 5 shows 
the energy that is released during the fires. The figure shows that the fires can be classified to 
small or large fires. About 40 % of the fires release less than about 1 GJ of energy and a little 
more than 50 % release more than 10 GJ. These fires represent different types of fires. Small 
ones are local fires that do not spread, whereas the large ones represent cable fires that spread 
along the cable trays (horizontally and/or vertically). Thus, classifying the fires according to the 
total released energy (GJ) is an option to simplify the event tree model. The small fires did not 
produce cable damage in the simulations. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of the energy released in the cable room fire simulations. 
Figure 6 shows the cumulative distribution of detection times for all simulated fires, for small 
fires (< 1 GJ) and for large fires (> 1 GJ). Lognormal fits are also shown. It can be seen that 
the total released energy in the fire seems to correlate with the detection time. The fires are 
(automatically) detected at the early stages and at this point, it does not matter if the fire is or 
is not spreading along the trays at the later stages of the fire. Thus, just the total heat released 
during the fire cannot be the reason for the different detection times. Figure 7 shows the 
detection time compared to the z coordinate of the initial fire. It can be seen that almost all 
small fires (< 1 GJ) are initiated at the cable trays that are close to the ceiling, while larger fires 
(> 1 GJ) are initiated at lower cable trays. The detection time of the small fires does not vary 
very much. The fires are initiated close to the ceiling and, thus, the fire gases and smoke are 
readily transported to the ceiling mounted detectors. The detection time spread is much larger 
for the large fires and there is not so noticeable trend with respect to the z coordinate of the 
initial fire. 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of detection times. Data is shown for all 100 fires, for small (< 1 GJ) and 
large (> 1 GJ) fires together with lognormal fits to the data. 
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Figure 7. Detection time of the fires compared to the z coordinate of the fire origin. 
The small vs. large fire classification of the fires can be further examined. Figure 8 shows the 
distributions of the peak times of the fires. The peak time is the time when the heat release 
rate of the fire is at its maximum. It is seen that the peak time of the large fires does not differ 
much from the peak times of small fires. So, there is not a strong correlation between the peak 
time and the ability of the fire to spread along the trays. The peak time is a variable that 
describes how fast the initial fire (user input) grows in the fire simulations. 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of the peak time. Data is shown for all 100 fires, for small (< 1 GJ) and 
large (> 1 GJ) fires. 
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The above analysis can be used to simplify the event tree based modelling of the cable room 
fire scenario. The small fires can be treated with a separate, very simple, event tree branch, 
because small fires do not produce damage to cables on the other redundancy group. The 
larger fires (> 1 GJ) are treated with a more complicated event tree model. Figure 9 shows that 
there is not a strong correlation between the peak time and detection time. This implies that 
the event tree model of the large fires can be simplified by separating the detection time from 
the simulated fires. The detection time can be implemented in the model as an independent 
distribution and not a part of the results of a specific fire simulation. 
 
Figure 9. Peak time vs. detection time. 
Figure 10 shows the correlation between the damage time and initial fire peak time. It is seen 
that on the average the damage occurs later for fires with late peak time. Cable damage 
happens a little bit later than the time when the initial fire has reached its peak value, on the 
average. This is a quite natural correlation. Fires that grow fast can form damage faster than 
slowly growing fires. 
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Figure 10. Damage time vs. peak time. 
3. Simulation-based event trees 
PRA software FinPSA (VTT 2019) includes a module for simulation-based event trees. The 
module has been developed for probabilistic analysis of severe nuclear reactor accidents 
(Tyrväinen et al. 2016, Tyrväinen & Karanta 2019), but it is, in practise, a general-purpose 
probabilistic risk analysis tool. The module combines event trees with computation scripts 
written using FinPSA’s own programming language, containment event tree language (CETL). 
In the script files, user defines functions that calculate probabilities of event tree branches and 
possibly other variable values, such as amounts of consequences or timings of events. The 
script files enable use of various different modelling approaches, because contents of the 
scripts are not limited in any way, except that they must conform the CETL syntax. 
The model includes a separate script file for each event tree section, for an initial section, and 
for a common section, which is common to all event trees in the project if there are multiple 
event trees. A function name is assigned to each event tree branch, and the function has to be 
defined in the script file of the corresponding event tree section. The function returns the 
probability of the event tree branch. It is also possible to write other functions that are called 
e.g. by branch functions. The model can include both global variables and local variables 
limited for a specific event tree section. Normal variable types, such as ‘real’, ‘integer’, 
‘Boolean’ and ‘string’, can be used. Distributions of few different types can also be specified. 
A set of built-in functions is available, including some distribution operations. 
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To account for uncertainties related to variable values, it is possible to specify probability 
distributions for parameters and perform Monte Carlo simulations. At each simulation cycle, a 
value is sampled from each specified distribution, and based on that, numerical conditional 
probabilities are calculated for all event tree branches, and values are calculated for all 
variables at each end point of the event tree. After the simulations, statistical analyses are 
performed to calculate frequency and variable value distributions for each end point among 
other statistical results and correlation analyses. It is also possible just to calculate point values 
of the event tree based on the mean values of distributions. Event tree sequences can also be 
grouped by a binner routine, and combined results can be calculated for the specified 
consequence categories. 
4. Model 
There are several different ways how the case study can be implemented in FinPSA. Firstly, 
the fire simulation results could be imported to FinPSA as probability distributions of relevant 
variables or vectors containing all simulation data. The vectors are selected here, because this 
is the more accurate approach to utilise the simulation results. It can be done since the number 
of fire simulation cycles is quite small. If distributions of cable failure time and time of intolerable 
firefighting conditions were estimated based on the simulation data and implemented in 
FinPSA, it would be more difficult to take into account the correlation between those two 
variables (see Section 2.2). Using all simulation data, the correlation is naturally taken into 
account at the same level as it is present in the simulation data. 
The second main modelling decision is related to the operation time model. It is possible to 
implement the entire operation time model in FinPSA or utilise distributions calculated with the 
Excel tool for simpler implementation of the FinPSA model. Even though both approaches 
could be equally accurate, it is decided that the entire model is re-implemented in FinPSA so 
that the new model is not dependent on the old Excel tool. The size of the model is not a 
problem, since it is significantly simpler than a typical level 2 PRA model. 
The new FinPSA event tree is presented in Figure 11. The model is simplified so that it is 
assumed that cable damage is automatically prevented if the automatic fire suppression 
system works, which was a conclusion made in the previous analysis (Hostikka et al. 2012). 
The operation time model is divided between eight event tree sections according to the 
operation phases. Cable damage occurs in sequence 4. In sequence 3, cable damage is 
prevented by the fire brigade. 
 
Figure 11: Event tree with operation time model. 
As discussed earlier, fire scenarios are modelled in FinPSA by importing all relevant data as 
vectors. Relevant variables from fire simulations are the detection time, cable damage time 
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and time when the firefighting conditions become intolerable. For each variable, a vector of 66 
elements is created, because cable damage occurred in 66 simulations according to 
temperature limit 180 °C. The simulations where cable damage did not occur are filtered out 
in event tree section Cable damage due to fire, i.e. the probability of the NoCD branch is set 
to 0.34. In FinPSA computation, for each of the 66 simulation cases, it is determined whether 
the cable failure occurs or not in every simulation cycle of FinPSA (operation time simulation 
cycle). 
The scripts behind the first event tree sections are very simple. Probabilities of the automatic 
fire suppression system and cable damage due to fire are specified directly in the scripts. The 
initial section defines global variables and the vectors representing the fire simulation results. 
The scripts related to the operation time related event tree sections are presented in the 
following. For each section, there is a routine ‘init’, where values are drawn for all random 
variables. There are three types of variables: probabilities of events (p-variables), time delay 
variables (t-variables) and random numbers between 0 and 1 used to determine whether an 
event occurs or not (r-variables). For each section, there is also a function of nil-type (which 
returns probability 1 in this case). These functions are used to calculate the values of time 
variables by summing the time delays depending on the events that occur. 
Fire is primarily detected automatically by smoke detectors. If automatic detection fails, fire is 
detected by the senses, but it takes likely much longer time. Possibility that detection by the 
senses is faster than automatic detection is also taken into account in the model by comparing 
detection times. It is also possible that the fire is detected from a wrong room causing delay. 
The automatic detection times come from fire simulations (DetectTime vector), and for each 
fire simulation case, the real detection time is determined taking into account also the 
possibility of detection by senses or from a wrong room. 
Detection of fire 
real p_dar, p_adf, t_dar, t_md, r_adf, r_dar 
 
integer i, n 
 
routine init 
  p_adf = raneven(0.001,0.02)  $ Automatic detection failure probability 
  p_dar = raneven(0.001,0.002) $ Probability of detection from another room 
 
  t_dar = raneven(1,15)        $ Detection from another room 
  t_md = raneven(1,120)        $ Manual detection 
 
  r_adf = random() 
  r_dar = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil FD 
  $ Detection time is determined for each fire simulation cycle 
  i = 1 
  $ While loop over the fire simulation cycles 
  while lesse(i,NumSim) do 
  begin 
    $ Detection occurs automatically or manually 
    if (r_adf > p_adf) and (DetectTime(i) < t_md) then 
    begin 
      $ Automatic detection time from fire simulation 
      RealDetTime(i) = DetectTime(i) 
    end 
    else 
    begin 
      $ Manual detection 
      RealDetTime(i) = t_md 
    end 
 
    $ Detection from another room? 
    if r_dar < p_dar then RealDetTime(i) = RealDetTime(i)+t_dar 
     
  
RESEARCH REPORT VTT-R-01302-19 
14 (22) 
 
 
 
    i = i+1 
  end 
 
  $ One detection time is selected for the computation of operation time distribution 
  n = simurun() 
  while more(n,NumSim) do n = n-NumSim 
  t_det = RealDetTime(n) 
return nil 
The guard centre has to make a collective alarm and call the unit director of fire brigade. If the 
guard centre personnel do not notice the automatic alarm, the guard centre becomes aware 
of the situation based on a call from the control room. Before that, the control room personnel 
have to set off the alarm. Wrong interpretation of the alarm by the control room can cause 
additional delay. Another additional delay occurs if the guard centre gives the fire brigade a 
wrong address. 
Guard centre 
real p_anf, p_wa, r_anf, r_wa, r_wi, t_mca, t_cud, t_wa 
 
routine init 
  p_anf = raneven(0.01,0.05) $ Auto-notification failure probability 
  p_wa = raneven(0.01,0.05)  $ Probability of wrong address 
  p_wi = raneven(0.01,0.05)  $ Probability of wrong interpretation of the alarm 
 
  t_mca = raneven(0.1,0.5)   $ Making a collective alarm 
  t_cud = raneven(1,1.5)     $ Calling the unit director 
  t_wa = raneven(2,10)       $ Wrong address 
  t_aso = raneven(0.5,5)     $ Alarm set-off 
  t_wi = raneven(1,10)       $ Wrong interpretation of the alarm 
  t_cgc = raneven(0.5,2)     $ Call to the guard centre 
 
  r_anf = random() 
  r_wa = random() 
  r_wi = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil GC 
  $ Guard centre operation time is determined 
  t_gc = t_mca+t_cud 
   
  if r_anf < p_anf then 
  begin 
    t_gc = t_gc+t_aso+t_cgc 
    if r_wi < p_wi then t_gc = t_gc+t_wi 
  end 
   
  if r_wa < p_wa then t_gc = t_gc+t_wa 
return nil 
The control room has to set off the alarm, call to the guard centre and send a person to confirm 
the fire. Wrong interpretation of the alarm can cause additional delay. When the fire brigade 
has arrived to the fire location, the control room needs to collaborate with the fire brigade. A 
credibility gap can cause delay in the collaboration. The control room may also need to switch 
off voltage from the cables (commented out in the scripts below). Failure to switch off voltage 
from some cables can cause significant additional delay. 
Control room 
real p_cg, p_vno, t_sp, t_cg, t_sov, t_vno, r_wi, r_cg, r_vno 
 
routine init 
  p_cg = raneven(0.01,0.1)  $ Probability of credibility gap 
  p_vno = raneven(0.03,0.3) $ Probability that voltage not switched off 
 
  t_sp = raneven(0.5,2)     $ Sending a person to ensure fire 
  t_co = raneven(1,10)      $ Collaboration 
  t_cg = raneven(3,5)       $ Credibility gap 
  t_sov = raneven(10,30)    $ Switching off the voltage 
  t_vno = raneven(10,30)    $ Voltage not switched off 
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  r_wi = random() 
  r_cg = random() 
  r_vno = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil CR 
  $ Control room operation time 
  t_cr = t_aso+t_cgc+t_sp 
  if r_wi < p_wi then t_cr = t_cr+t_wi 
 
  $ Collaboration time 
  if r_cg < p_cg then t_co = t_co+t_cg 
 
  $ Delay from switching off voltage 
  $ t_v = t_sov 
  $ if r_vno < p_vno then t_v = t_v+t_vno 
  t_v = 0 
return nil 
The control room has to send a person to confirm the fire. Walking to the room takes some 
time, and additional delay may be caused by selecting a wrong route. 
Fire confirmation 
real p_wr, t_msp, t_wro, t_wr, r 
 
routine init 
  p_wr = raneven(0.01,0.1) $ Probability of choosing a wrong route 
 
  t_msp = raneven(0,15)    $ Moving to the starting point 
  t_wro = raneven(2,3)     $ Walking to the room of origin 
  t_wr = raneven(1,15)     $ Choosing a wrong route 
 
  r = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil FC 
  $ Fire confirmation time is determined and added to the control room operation time 
  t_fc = t_msp+t_wro 
 
  if r < p_wr then t_fc = t_fc+t_wr 
 
  t_cr = t_cr+t_fc 
return nil 
For the fire brigade response time, a gamma distribution has been estimated based on 
statistics from drills carried out at the plant. Since, the programming language does not 
currently offer a gamma distribution function, the distribution is implemented as a DPD 
distribution of CETL. The DPD distribution is defined by 13 cumulative percentile values (0%, 
2.5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 97.5%, 100%). The values between 
those values are calculated by linear interpolation by FinPSA. Additional delays to the 
response time may be caused by heading to a wrong target, crew or equipment being 
unavailable, route barrier and other alarm. 
Fire brigade response time 
real p_wt, p_uc, p_ue, p_rb, p_oa, t_wt, t_uc, t_ue, t_rb, t_oa, 
     r_wt, r_uc, r_ue, r_rb, r_oa 
 
DPD ResponseTime = (0.24,0.586,1.07,1.51,1.90,2.29,2.69,3.14,3.68,4.38,5.48,7.49,10) 
 
routine init 
  p_wt = raneven(0.02,0.2)    $ Probability of wrong target 
  p_uc = raneven(0.05,0.5)    $ Unavailability of crew 
  p_ue = raneven(0.01,0.1)    $ Unavailability of equipment 
  p_rb = 0.06                 $ Probability of route barrier 
  p_oa = 0.03                 $ Probability of other alarm 
 
  t_rt = randpd(ResponseTime) $ Response time 
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  t_wt = raneven(2,4)         $ Wrong target 
  t_uc = raneven(5,8)         $ Crew unavailable 
  t_ue = raneven(5,10)        $ Equipment unavailable 
  t_rb = raneven(5,10)        $ Route barrier 
  t_oa = raneven(10,15)       $ Other alarm 
 
  r_wt = random() 
  r_uc = random() 
  r_ue = random() 
  r_rb = random() 
  r_oa = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil RT 
  $ Total response time is determined 
  if p_wt > r_wt then t_rt = t_rt+t_wt 
  if p_uc > r_uc then t_rt = t_rt+t_uc 
  if p_ue > r_ue then t_rt = t_rt+t_ue 
  if p_rb > r_rb then t_rt = t_rt+t_rb 
  if p_oa > r_oa then t_rt = t_rt+t_oa 
return nil 
Time to the building entrance is the time from the fire truck to the door of the building. Additional 
delays may be caused by a broken hose, broken coupling or a pump failure. 
Building entrance 
real p_bh, p_bc, p_pf, t_bh, t_bc, t_pf, r_bh, r_bc, r_pf 
 
routine init 
  p_bh = raneven(0.02,0.1)  $ Probability of broken hose 
  p_bc = raneven(0.01,0.05) $ Probability of broken coupling 
  p_pf = raneven(0.01,0.05) $ Pump failure to start probability 
 
  t_be = raneven(0.5,5)     $ Time to the building entrance 
  t_bh = raneven(2,4)       $ Broken hose 
  t_bc = raneven(2,4)       $ Broken coupling 
  t_pf = raneven(2,4)       $ Pump fails to start 
 
  r_bh = random() 
  r_bc = random() 
  r_pf = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil BE 
  $ Total time to building entrance is determined 
  if r_bh < p_bh then t_be = t_be+t_bh 
  if r_bc < p_bc then t_be = t_be+t_bc 
  if r_pf < p_pf then t_be = t_be+t_pf 
return nil 
The time it takes to move from the building door to the room where the fire is located has been 
calculated based on the distance and speed, which has been assumed constant. Additional 
delays may be caused by forgotten keys or wedges or a broken hose. 
Fire brigade to the room 
real p_fk, p_fw, p_bh, t_fk, t_fw, t_bh, r_fk, r_fw, r_bh 
 
routine init 
  p_fk = raneven(0.02,0.2) $ Probability that keys are forgotten 
  p_fw = raneven(0.02,0.2) $ Probability that wedges are forgotten 
  p_bh = raneven(0.05,0.3) $ Probability of broken hose 
 
  t_re = 0.462             $ Time to the room entrance 
  t_fk = raneven(3,6)      $ Forgotten the keys 
  t_fw = raneven(1,2)      $ Forgotten the wedges 
  t_bh = raneven(1,2)      $ Broken hose 
 
  r_fk = random() 
  r_fw = random() 
  r_bh = random() 
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return 
 
 
function nil FBR 
  $ Total room entrance time is determined 
  if r_fk < p_fk then t_re = t_re+t_fk 
  if r_fw < p_fw then t_re = t_re+t_fw 
  if r_bh < p_bh then t_re = t_re+t_bh 
return nil 
The fire brigade has to perform a systematic search to find the fire. Additional delays may be 
caused by a forgotten thermal camera, a loss of pressure from a hose or a communication 
problem. 
Systematic search 
real p_fc, p_pl, p_cp, t_fc, t_pl, t_cp, r_fc, r_pl, r_cp 
 
routine init 
  p_fc = raneven(0.02,0.2) $ Probability that the thermal camera is forgotten 
  p_pl = raneven(0.05,0.3) $ Probability of pressure loss 
  p_cp = raneven(0.05,0.3) $ Probability of communication problem 
 
  t_ss = raneven(0,7)      $ Systematic search 
  t_fc = raneven(0,3)      $ Forgotten the thermal camera 
  t_pl = raneven(1,5)      $ Pressure loss 
  t_cp = raneven(2,5)      $ Communication problem 
 
  r_fc = random() 
  r_pl = random() 
  r_cp = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil SS 
  $ Total search time is determined 
  if r_fc < p_fc then t_ss = t_ss+t_fc 
  if r_pl < p_pl then t_ss = t_ss+t_pl 
  if r_cp < p_cp then t_ss = t_ss+t_cp 
return nil 
In the final section of the event tree, the operation time from the detection to the beginning of 
the systematic search is calculated. Then, for each fire simulation cycle, it is checked whether 
the cable failure occurs before the suppression, and whether the room conditions are such that 
the fire brigade can enter the room when they are ready. In other words, for each fire 
simulation, it is determined whether the fire brigade is in time or not. The probability of a cable 
failure is calculated based on the number of simulation cycles where the fire brigade was too 
late. 
function real TooLate 
  $ Operation time from the detection to the beginning of the systematic search is calculated 
  t_oper = t_co+t_v 
  if t_cr < t_gc+t_rt+t_be+t_re then 
  begin 
    t_oper = t_oper+t_gc+t_rt+t_be+t_re 
  end 
  else 
  begin 
    t_oper = t_oper+t_cr 
  end 
 
  i = 1 
  c = 0 
  $ While loop over the fire simulation cycles 
  while lesse(i,NumSim) do 
  begin 
    if lesse(DamageTime(i),RealDetTime(i)+t_oper+t_ss) then 
    begin 
      $ Cable damage occurs before suppression 
      c = c+1 
    end 
    else if lesse(BadConditions(i),RealDetTime(i)+t_oper) then 
    begin 
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      $ Not possible to enter the room due to intolerable conditions 
      c = c+1 
    end 
    i = i+1 
  end 
 
  $ Probability of cable failure 
  p = c/NumSim 
 
  $ Total operation time from the ignition 
  t_oper = t_oper+t_det+t_ss 
  Damage = true 
return p 
The FinPSA model was simulated 10000 cycles. The resulting cable failure probability was 
0.0158 for the case where the voltage cut-off is not needed. The Excel-based PFS tool 
produced cable failure probability of 0.0154 with the equivalent operation time model (slightly 
different from (Hostikka et al. 2012)). Naturally, the simulation models produce slightly different 
results depending on the drawn random numbers. Both tools produced also approximately the 
same operation time distribution, and the average lengths of different operation phases were 
approximately the same. Based on this, it can be concluded that the new FinPSA model is 
capable of producing results sufficiently similar to PFS, even though the exactly same results 
cannot be reproduced. 
The probability that the fire brigade suppresses the fire is quite small in this case, 0.00409. 
The sprinkler system is much more likely to prevent the cable failure. If the sprinkler system 
fails and the fire is large enough to damage the cable, the fire brigade is in time with a 
probability of 0.21. 
Table 1 presents the average lengths of different operational phases. The correlation of the 
length of each operational phase to the cable failure probability is also presented. Based on 
the correlations, it can be identified that the control room operation, co-operation, systematic 
search and fire brigade response are to most critical phases with regard to a cable failure. 
These phases are also the phases that typically last longest. The best way to improve the 
result would be to improve the operation in these phases. 
Table 1: Results of individual operational phases. 
Variable Average (min) Correlation to cable failure 
probability 
Detection time 1.88 0.057 
Control room 15.9 0.45 
Guard centre 1.86 0.074 
Fire brigade response time 6.38 0.25 
Fire brigade to the building entrance 3.13 0.082 
Fire brigade to the room of origin 1.41 0.069 
Co-operation 5.70 0.34 
Systematic search 4.80 0.26 
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To study the impact of modelling the firefighting conditions, the model was changed so that the 
fire brigade was assumed to be able to enter the room in every case. The cable failure 
probability decreased only to 0.0150. This means that the contribution of cases where the 
conditions at the door prevent the firefighting even though the fire brigade is otherwise in time 
is quite small. The reason for this is that in most fire cases the conditions become intolerable 
after the cable failure or just before it. Regardless, the cable failure probability would be 
underestimated by not evaluating the firefighting conditions. 
For future studies, the detection modelling can be simplified, because it was identified in 
Section 2.2 that the automatic detection time does not correlate significantly with the cable 
failure time. Instead of using explicitly the times from the fire simulation, automatic detection 
times can be drawn from a lognormal distribution estimated based on the fire simulation results. 
The detection of fire scripts can then be simplified as follows: 
real p_dar, p_adf, t_dar, t_md, t_ad, r_adf, r_dar 
 
integer i 
 
routine init 
  p_adf = raneven(0.001,0.02)  $ Automatic detection failure probability 
  p_dar = raneven(0.001,0.002) $ Probability of detection from another room 
 
  t_dar = raneven(1,15)        $ Detection from another room 
  t_md = raneven(1,120)        $ Manual detection 
  t_ad = ranlogn(1.23,2.46)    $ Automatic detection time 
 
  r_adf = random() 
  r_dar = random() 
return 
 
 
function nil FD 
  $ Detection time is determined 
  if (r_adf > p_adf) and (t_ad < t_md) then 
  begin 
    t_det = t_ad 
  end 
  else 
  begin 
    t_det = t_md 
  end 
 
  if r_dar < p_dar then t_det = t_det+t_dar 
return nil 
Some minor changes in the cable failure section are also needed. This new model produces 
results very close to the model presented earlier. 
5. Discussion 
In this study, a fire PRA model including an operation time model of firefighting actions was 
implemented in a  tool that has not been used for this purpose previously, FinPSA. Compared 
with the Excel tool PFS, the FinPSA model of operation times seems better structured, and 
easier to read and maintain. FinPSA is easier to use than the heavy Excel file, though the user 
must first learn to use FinPSA and learn the CETL syntax. It is easier to write complex 
computation in FinPSA scripts than in Excel. Excel provides possibilities to customize the 
presentation of results, whereas FinPSA does not, but FinPSA simulation data can also be 
exported to Excel. Excel suits better for handling of large amounts of input data, though in this 
case, the size of the data is quite limited. A benefit of PFS is also that it creates the fire 
simulation cases automatically and manages the simulations. In that purpose, it is not practical 
to replace PFS by FinPSA. 
It was easy to import all relevant fire simulation data in FinPSA, because the number of 
simulation cycles was so small. However, with larger number of simulation cycles, this might 
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not be practical. The current limit for a vector in FinPSA is 1000 elements, but already for 
hundreds of simulation cycles, it would become tedious to import the data manually. One 
possibility would be to develop an automatic import routine that would read the data from an 
input file. Alternatively, the modelling approach could be changed. Fire simulations could be 
divided into suitable categories so that modelling of dependencies could be done sufficiently 
accurately inside those categories without importing all the data (e.g. by importing estimated 
distributions of relevant variables taking into account the dependencies). The fire categories 
could have separate event tree branches. For example, simulations with late cable failure (e.g. 
later than 30 minutes) could be one category according to Figure 4, because the correlation 
between the cable failure time and firefighting conditions is different in those cases compared 
to other cases. Anyhow, Monte Carlo fire simulations by a CFD-simulator are so heavy that it 
is unlikely that the number of realizations will increase very much in the near future. 
One option for further development of the modelling approach would be to utilise event tree 
based modelling more, i.e. to create branches for events related to the fire brigade operations. 
The benefit of the branching would be to put more focus on rare events. For example, the case 
of having a credibility gap could be evaluated this way in every simulation cycle instead of 
about 5.5% of the simulation cycles. This would increase the accuracy of the analysis. 
However, the model contains so many random events that the event tree would become too 
large if branches were created for all events. A more realistic option would be to create 
branches only for the most important events, which would have to be identified first. This 
particular analysis case is however such that it is more likely that the fire brigade is late than 
in time. This means that there is not much need to put more focus on delay events, since it is 
uncertain whether the fire brigade is in time even without the delays, and the fire brigade being 
in time is actually the rarer event. With this regard, the analysis case differs significantly from 
normal NPP PRA. The branching approach would be more useful if the case was such that the 
fire brigade being late was a rare event. Such fire analysis cases exist too, e.g. in (Kloos et al. 
2014), so the approach is worth considering in future studies. 
Another potential area for future development is uncertainty analysis, i.e. computation of an 
uncertainty distribution for the cable failure probability. The model already contains uncertainty 
distributions for various time delays and uncertainties in fire progression are also taken into 
account, but proper uncertainty analysis of the cable failure probability would require 
separation of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties (Durka Rao et al. 2007), which are now 
totally mixed in the model. The reason for this is that the probability of the cable failure itself 
represents the aleatory uncertainty on the occurrence of the cable failure, and the uncertainty 
distribution of the probability should represent uncertainty due to lack of knowledge, i.e. 
epistemic uncertainty. To perform the analysis, for each time variable, it should be analysed 
what is the uncertainty caused by lack of knowledge (epistemic) and what is the uncertainty 
caused by the randomness of the action or event (aleatory). It would mean that for each time 
variable, there would be a distribution representing aleatory uncertainty, and there would also 
be distributions for the parameters of that distribution representing epistemic uncertainty. 
Similarly, epistemic and aleatory uncertainties should be separated in fire progression 
modelling. Boneham et al. (2019) have developed a systematic process for the identification 
and characterization of uncertainties in fire PRA. The uncertainty analysis sets also 
requirements for the computation tool. Epistemic and aleatory variables could e.g. be handled 
in separate sampling loops as presented in (Tyrväinen & Karanta 2019) and (Boneham et al. 
2019). This type of functionality has however not been implemented in FinPSA yet. 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, probabilistic analysis of an old nuclear power plant cable room fire scenario has 
been successfully implemented in a new tool, simulation-based event tree of FinPSA. The 
main components of the model are Monte Carlo fire simulations and a stochastic operation 
  
RESEARCH REPORT VTT-R-01302-19 
21 (22) 
 
 
 
time model for firefighting. The fire simulations are performed separately using FDS software, 
and the results of the simulations are imported to FinPSA. The operation time model is 
implemented in FinPSA scripts in eight parts corresponding to different operational phases. 
The results calculated using FinPSA are approximately same as the results calculated by 
Excel-based Probabilistic Fire Simulator (PFS). FinPSA offers better model structure, better 
readability and better maintainability than PFS. In the script files of FinPSA, it is easier to 
develop complex computation rules. FinPSA may therefore be considered a useful and 
practical tool for fire PRA modelling. 
The study could be continued e.g. by modelling firefighting actions and their dependency on 
fire progression more realistically. Cooling from the door could also be an option for the fire 
brigade. Other conditions than visibility at the door could be taken into account, and fire brigade 
could possibly enter the room from a different door if it is not possible from the first door. The 
cable room fire scenario should also be updated for present situation, including more accurate 
analysis of the automatic suppression system and the new guidance for the voltage cut off 
procedure. The study could also be extended by analysing more consequences, e.g. failures 
of different cables and fire spreading. This would require new fire simulations. Larger number 
of simulation results would increase the accuracy of the analysis, but could also introduce new 
challenges for the modelling. The long-term goal is to develop a general-purpose approach for 
fire PRA. It however requires analysis of a wider range of fire scenarios, because different 
modelling techniques may be needed in other fire analysis cases. Another possibility for 
improvement would be to perform comprehensive uncertainty analysis. 
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